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Abstract 
Based on survey data from 193 banks in 20 countries we provide the first bank-level analysis of the 
determinants of foreign currency (FX) lending in Emerging Europe. We find that FX lending by all 
banks,  regardless  of  their  ownership  structure,  is  strongly  determined  by  the  macroeconomic 
environment. We find no evidence of foreign banks ‘pushing’ FX loans indiscriminately because of 
easier access to wholesale funding in foreign currency. In fact, while foreign banks do lend more in 
FX to corporate clients, they do not do so to retail clients. We also find that after a take-over by a 
foreign bank, the acquired bank does not increase its FX lending any faster than a bank which remains 
in domestic hands. 
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Unhedged foreign currency (FX) borrowing is seen as a major threat to financial stability 
in Eastern Europe. More than 70 percent of all private sector loans in Estonia, Latvia, and 
Serbia are currently denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency. The share of FX loans 
also exceeds that of domestic currency loans in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (EBRD, 
2010).  FX  borrowing  throughout  the  region  is  dominated  by  retail  loans  –  household 
mortgages and small business loans – to clients which typically have their income and assets 
in local currency. It is therefore not surprising that national authorities have taken measures 
to  discourage  such  loans.  Supervisors  in  Hungary,  Latvia  and  Poland  for  instance  have 
pushed banks to disclose the exchange rate risks of FX loans to clients and to tighten the 
eligibility criteria for such loans. In countries like Croatia, Kazakhstan and Romania stronger 
provisioning  requirements  were  also  imposed  on  FX  compared  to  local  currency  loans. 
Ukraine even completely banned FX lending to households in late 2008. 
The  call  for  policies  to  curb  FX  lending  in  Eastern  Europe  has  intensified  in  recent 
months. In June 2010 the ECB stated that national efforts to rein in FX lending have had little 
impact  and  called  for  coordinated  efforts,  including  among  regulators  from  the  home 
countries of banks which own subsidiaries in Eastern Europe.
1 In this line of thinking FX 
lending is largely supply-driven, with FX funding of banks, often by their parent banks, at the 
heart  of  the  problem.  To  the  extent  that  FX  lending  does  not  reflect  macroeconomic 
uncertainty  and  related  underlying  vulnerabilities,  regulation  may  help  to  counterbalance 
distortions –such as banks and borrowers that disregard the negative externalities of FX loans 
in terms of increasing the risk of a systemic crisis (see Ranciere et al., 2010). 
                                                 
1 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201006en.pdf.  
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Surprisingly, the widespread view that FX lending in Eastern Europe is driven by funding 
of  banks  in  FX  has  not  yet  been  substantiated  by  empirical  analysis.  Comparisons  of 
aggregate cross-country data document higher shares of FX lending in countries where banks 
have larger cross-border liabilities (Bakker and Gulde, 2010; Basso et al., 2007). However, 
whether cross-border liabilities are causing or being caused by FX loans is hard to establish 
from such aggregate data. Recent loan-level evidence for Bulgaria suggests that FX lending is 
at least partly driven by customer deposits in FX, while wholesale funding in FX is a result, 
rather than  a cause of  FX lending (Brown  et al., 2010).  It is unclear whether this result 
applies to a broad set of banks across the transition region. 
In this paper we use bank-level data to help clarify what is driving FX lending in Eastern 
Europe and to assess the appropriateness of the current policy response. Our main data source 
is the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) conducted in 2005 and 
covering 220 foreign-owned and domestic-owned banks in 20 transition countries. The BEPS 
questionnaire elicits detailed information on the loan and deposit structure of each bank in 
2001 and 2004, as well as its risks management procedures, as well as its assessment of 
creditor rights and banking regulation in its country of operation. We match our data from 
BEPS with financial statement data provided by Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database, as 
well as with country-level indicators of the interest rate differential on foreign versus local 
currency funds, real exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility, and the type of exchange rate 
regime. 
The countries and observation period covered by our data is particularly interesting to 
study FX lending dynamics. During this period foreign currency lending to corporate clients 
was already widespread in Eastern Europe. For the banks in our sample the mean share of the 
corporate loan portfolio denominated in FX was 41 percent in 2001 and 44 percent in 2004. 
During this three-year period we do, however, observe an increase in FX lending by some  
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banks,  while  others  reduced  their  FX  lending  substantially.  Furthermore,  FX  lending  to 
households  increased  substantially  across  Eastern  Europe  during  our  observation  period. 
Considering the banks in our sample, we find that the share of FX loans in their household 
loan portfolio increased from 28 percent in 2001 to 38 percent in 2004. Our data allow us to 
investigate to what extent these developments in FX lending to corporate and household 
clients are related to changes in the ownership of banks, to changes in their funding structure, 
or to changes in macroeconomic conditions. 
Our  results  contradict  the  view  that  foreign-owned  banks  are  driving  FX  lending 
throughout  Eastern  Europe  as  a  result  of  their  easier  access  to  cross-border  wholesale 
funding. As a matter of fact we do not find robust evidence that wholesale funding had a 
causal effect on FX lending for any type of bank over the 2001-04 period. Although we find 
that foreign banks do lend more in FX to corporate clients, they do not do so to households. 
Further, banks which are taken over by foreigners do not increase their FX lending faster than 
domestic banks which are not taken over. Finally, we find no evidence of multinational banks 
using their internal capital market to actively push FX lending throughout their subsidiary 
networks towards some ‘target’ level of FX lending. By contrast, we do find evidence for 
‘contagion’ of FX lending within countries: banks with low levels of FX lending in 2001 –
compared  to  the  country  average–  increase  their  FX  lending  more  strongly  over  the 
subsequent three years. But this holds for domestic and foreign banks alike. 
Our results indicate that macroeconomic stability is a key determinant of FX lending in the 
transition economies. In line with recent evidence by Brown et al. (2009) we find that interest 
rate differentials are not positively related to FX lending. On the contrary, we find that banks 
in countries that saw a sharp decline in interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the euro between 
2001 and 2004 expanded their FX lending the most during this period. This suggests that the 
(expected)  macroeconomic  stability  which  led  to  interest  rate  declines  is  a  stronger  
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determinant of FX lending than interest rate advantages. This conjecture is supported by the 
finding that real exchange rate volatility does discourage FX lending. As an indirect indicator 
of the importance of macroeconomic stability we also find that FX deposits by customers, 
which  are  arguably  driven  by  macroeconomic  conditions,  appear  to  be  a  very  strong 
determinant of FX lending. 
Our results provide important insights to policy makers into the drivers of FX lending in 
Eastern  Europe.  In  particular,  they  suggest  that  credible  macroeconomic  policies  which 
encourage  depositors  to  save  in  local  currency  may  be  more  important  than  regulatory 
proposals to limit the wholesale funding of banks. As suggested recently by Zettelmeyer et al. 
(2010), while abundant foreign funding may have aggravated FX lending, in many countries 
the underlying cause was the lack of credible macroeconomic policies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our study to the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature on FX lending. Section 3 then describes our data and 
Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 sets out our policy conclusions. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
In  this  section  we  review  existing  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  on  the  currency 
denomination  of  bank  loans,  establishing  the  hypotheses  for  our  empirical  analysis  and 
clarifying our contribution to the literature. 
2.1. Theory 
From a theoretical perspective, foreign currency lending by a bank will first of all be 
influenced by monetary conditions. On the demand side firms and households will be more 
likely to request FX loans when interest differentials are high and real exchange rate volatility 
is low (see e.g. Brown et al., 2009). Luca and Petrova (2008) examine a model of credit  
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dollarisation in which risk-averse banks and firms choose an optimal portfolio of foreign 
currency  and  local  currency  loans.  In  line  with  other  portfolio-choice  models  of  foreign 
currency debt (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003) they predict that banks will offer more foreign 
currency loans when the volatility of domestic inflation is high and the volatility of the real 
exchange rate is low. Thus, in countries where the monetary authority has not established a 
credible reputation for pursuing price stability this could imply that banks prefer to make 
loans in foreign currency. This tendency may be stronger for long-term than for short-term 
loans as long-term monetary policy may be particularly unpredictable. 
Second, FX lending may be a function of the composition of a bank’s clientele. Goswami 
and Shrikande (2001) show how firms may use foreign currency debt as a hedging instrument 
for the exchange rate exposure of their revenues.
2 They assume that the uncovered interest 
rate parity holds
3 and therefore interest rate differentials do not motivate foreign currency 
borrowing in their model. However, a wide body of evidence suggests that this parity does 
not hold for many currencies (see for instance Froot and Thaler (1990) or Isard (2006)). 
Cowan (2006) and Brown et al. (2009) consider firms’ choices of loan currency in models 
where the cost of foreign currency debt is lower than the cost of local currency debt. Cowan 
(2006) shows that firms will be more likely to choose foreign currency debt the higher the 
interest rate differential, the larger their share of income in foreign currency and the lower 
their distress costs in case of default. The incentive to take foreign currency loans is weaker 
when  the  volatility  of  the  exchange  rate  is  higher,  as  this  increases  the  default  risk  on 
unhedged loans. Brown et al. (2009) show that not only firms with foreign currency income, 
                                                 
2 Economic exposure to foreign currency can also be managed with foreign exchange derivatives. See Brown 
(2001) and Mian (1996) for a broad discussion of corporate hedging instruments. 
3 This means that the differences in the nominal interest rates between currencies are cancelled out by the 
changes in their exchange rate so that the costs of foreign and local currency borrowing are identical.  
 
6 
but also firms with high income in local currency (compared to their debt service burden) will 
be  more  likely  to  choose  foreign  currency  loans,  as  their  probability  to  default  due  to 
exchange rate movements is lower. They also examine the impact of bank-firm information 
asymmetries on loan currency choice, showing that when lenders are imperfectly informed 
about the currency or level of firm revenue, local currency borrowers may be more likely to 
choose foreign currency loans.
4 While focused on commercial loans, the models of Cowan 
(2006) and Brown et al. (2009) are also relevant for FX lending to households. They predict 
that households with assets denominated in foreign currency, such as real estate in many 
countries, as well as households with FX income or high income to debt service levels will be 
more likely to borrow in foreign currency. 
Third,  the  share  of  foreign  currency  assets  held  by  a  bank  will  also  be  related  to  the 
currency structure of its liabilities. Banks are typically limited by prudential regulation in the 
foreign  currency  exposure  they  can  take.  In  a  country  with  underdeveloped  derivative 
markets for foreign currency exchange this regulation implies that banks’ supply of loans in 
foreign currency will be partly determined by their liabilities in these currencies. Basso et al. 
(2007) suggest that banks’ supply of foreign currency loans will depend on their own access 
to foreign currency debt through financial markets or from parent banks abroad. Similarly, 
Luca and Petrova (2008) argue that increases in banks’ access to foreign currency deposits 
will lead them to offer more foreign currency loans.
5 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence 
                                                 
4 Banks may not be able to verify the income sources of small firms which do not keep detailed and audited 
financial  records  (Berger  and  Udell,  1998).  This  information  asymmetry  may  be  particularly  pressing  in 
countries with weak corporate governance (Brown et al., 2009) and a strong presence of foreign banks which 
have less knowledge about local firms (Detragiache et al., 2008). 
5 For a discussion of deposit dollarisation see De Nicolo et al. (2005).  
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Cross-country  comparisons  of  aggregate  credit  document  a  strong  role  for  monetary 
conditions in explaining the use of foreign currency in developing and transition economies. 
Most recently, Luca and Petrova (2008) analyze the aggregate share of foreign currency loans 
for 21 transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 
2003. They find that the aggregate share of foreign currency loans is positively related to 
interest  rate  differentials  and  domestic  monetary  volatility,  and  negatively  related  to  the 
volatility of the exchange rate. Earlier work by Arteta (2002) on a broad sample of low-
income  countries  as  well  as  Barajas  and  Morales  (2003)  on  Latin  America  confirms  the 
hypothesis that higher exchange rate volatility reduces aggregate credit dollarisation. Firm-
level studies find more mixed results concerning the impact of monetary conditions on the 
currency composition of firm debt. Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) as well as Allayanis et al. 
(2003) find that the use of foreign currency debt by corporate firms is strongly related to 
interest rate differentials. Brown et al. (2009) by contrast find only a weak impact of interest 
rate differentials and no impact of exchange rate volatility on the use of foreign currency 
loans among small firms in transition economies. 
A  broad  set  of  studies  confirm  that  the  use  of  FX  debt  is  related  to  borrower 
characteristics, in particular borrower income structure.  Large  firms have been shown to 
match loan currencies to those of their sales in the US (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003), Europe 
(Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001), Latin America (Martinez and Werner (2002), Gelos (2003), 
and Benavente et al. ( 2003)) and East Asia (Allayannis et al., 2003). More recent evidence 
suggests that the use of a foreign rather than a local currency loan by retail clients is also 
strongly  related  to  borrower  characteristics.  Brown  et  al.  (2009)  examine  the  currency 
denomination of the most recent loan received by 3,105 small firms in 24 transition countries. 
They find strong evidence that the choice of an FX loan is related to foreign currency cash 
flow. In contrast, they find only weak evidence that FX borrowing is affected by firm-level  
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distress costs or financial opaqueness. Brown et al. (2010) examine requested and granted 
loan currencies using credit-file data for over 100,000 loans to small firms in Bulgaria. They 
show that firms with revenue in foreign currency, lower leverage and lower distress costs are 
more likely to ask for an FX loan, and are more likely to receive such a loan. Beer et al. 
(2010) examine survey data covering over 2,500 Austrian households and find that those 
households with higher wealth, higher income and better education are more likely to have 
foreign currency (CHF) rather than local currency (EUR) mortgages. 
Finally, recent evidence for Eastern Europe provides mixed evidence on the role of bank 
funding as a driver of FX lending. Basso et al. (2007) examine aggregate credit dollarisation 
for 24 transition countries for the period 2000–2006. They find that countries in which banks 
have a higher share of foreign funding display a higher share of FX loans. Luca and Petrova 
(2008) by contrast find no robust relation between aggregate lending in FX across transition 
countries and aggregate foreign liabilities of banks. They do, however, find a strong relation 
between  aggregate  levels  of  deposit  “dollarisation”  and  FX  lending.  Brown  et  al.  (2010) 
provide loan-level evidence that FX lending is driven by customer funding of banks in FX, 
rather than wholesale funding in FX. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on FX debt by examining how banks’ FX 
lending is impacted by their macroeconomic environment as well as their ownership, client 
and funding structure. We use our dataset to test three main hypotheses: (i) Low exchange 
rate volatility, high inflation volatility, and large interest rate differentials have a positive 
impact on a bank’s proportion of FX loans; (ii) Foreign ownership has a positive impact on a 
bank’s proportion of FX loans, and (iii) Access to FX denominated wholesale and deposit 
funding has a positive impact on a bank’s proportion of FX loans. 
By testing these hypotheses with bank-level loan portfolio data, our paper complements 
recent cross-country studies of aggregate FX lending (Luca and Petrova (2008) and Basso et  
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al. (2007)). It also complements the firm-level studies by Brown et al. (2009) and Brown et 
al. (2010) by providing micro-evidence on FX lending to both firms and households.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. The Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) 
Our  main  data  source  is  the  EBRD  Banking  Environment  and  Performance  Survey 
(BEPS) conducted in 2005 across 20 transition countries. The BEPS questionnaire elicits 
detailed information on the loan and deposit structure, including the currency denomination, 
of a large number of banks in 2001 and 2004. Information was also collected on banks’ risks 
management practices and their own assessment of creditor rights and banking regulation. 
BEPS also provides detailed information on bank ownership, which allows us to differentiate 
between three ownership categories: banks with majority domestic ownership, newly created 
foreign  banks  (greenfields),  and  privatized  banks  with  majority  foreign  ownership 
(takeovers). 
From the 1,976 banks operating in the transition region in 2005 the EBRD approached the 
419  banks  which  were  covered  by  Bureau  van  Dijk’s  BankScope  database.  These  banks 
represent more than three quarters of all banking assets in the transition region. Of these 
banks 220 agreed to participate in the BEPS survey. There are only small differences between 
banks that  agreed to participate in  BEPS and those that declined. De  Haas  et al.  (2010) 
provide  a  detailed  description  of  the  BEPS  survey  and  how  it  provides  a  representative 
picture of the underlying banking population in Emerging Europe in terms of bank size and 
bank ownership. Both in BankScope and in BEPS 7 percent of the banks are state-owned and 
while in BankScope 47 percent of  all banks are foreign owned, in BEPS 55 percent are 
foreign owned. Finally, while in BankScope 45 percent of all banks are private domestic  
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banks,  38  percent  of  all  banks  in  BEPS  belong  to  this  category.  There  is  only  a  weak 
relationship between bank size and inclusion in BEPS. 
The dataset we use in this paper excludes 27 banks for which information on the currency 
composition  of  loans  was  not  available.  We  thus  have  a  sample  of  193  banks  from  20 
countries, of which 98 are domestic banks (private or state-owned), 44 greenfield foreign 
banks, and 51 are foreign banks that are the result of a take-over of a former domestic bank.
6 
Table 1 shows the geographical distribution of these banks over the transition region. The 
sample is fairly evenly distributed over the three main sub-regions: Central Europe and the 
Baltic countries, South Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
In terms of ownership, our sample also reflects that the banking sector in the CIS has seen 
less foreign direct investment compared to the more Western parts of the transition region. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
From the BEPS we yield two indicators of bank-level foreign currency lending as our 
dependent variables: FX loans corporates is the share of a bank’s outstanding loan portfolio 
to firms which is denominated in foreign currency. Likewise, FX loans households is the 
share of the outstanding loan portfolio to households denominated in foreign currency. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
                                                 
6 We merge private domestic banks and state-owned banks in the category domestic banks. A separate analysis 
of these two categories yields similar qualitative results.  
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Figure 1 depicts the 2001 and 2004 values for these dependent variables for the 193 banks 
in  our  dataset.  The  figure  shows  a  quite  strong  correlation  between  the  2001  and  2004 
proportion  of  corporate  lending  in  FX.  By  contrast,  during  this  period  many  banks 
experienced stronger changes in the currency denomination of their household loan portfolio.  
Overall, the share of FX loans to households in our sample increased from 28 percent in 2001 
to  38  percent  in  2004.  However,  as  Figure  1  shows,  these  averages  mask  substantial 
heterogeneity in the development of household lending across banks. 
 
3.2. Explanatory variables 
Table 2 provides a description and the source of all variables we use in our empirical 
analysis. We construct bank ownership dummies that indicate whether a bank is a Foreign 
greenfield  bank,  a  Foreign  takeover  bank,  or  a  Domestic  bank  in  2004.  Information  to 
construct  these  dummies  is  taken  from  BEPS  and  where  needed  supplemented  with 
information from banks’ websites. We also create a dummy Foreign acquired that indicates 
takeover banks that were acquired in the  year  2000, 2001, or 2002. Finally, we  create a 
variable Foreign held which is 1 for all banks that were foreign-owned throughout 2000-04 
and 0 for all banks which were domestically owned throughout this period. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
In addition to these ownership variables, we yield several other bank-level variables from 
BEPS  and  BankScope.  Assets  measures  total  bank  assets  in  log  USD  and  is  taken  from 
BankScope. It can be seen as an indicator of both client-structure and bank-funding. On the 
one hand, larger banks are more likely to serve large firms, which may have a higher demand 
for  FX  debt.  On  the  other  hand,  larger  banks  may  have  better  access  to  cross-border  
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wholesale  funding. Second, we use  BEPS to  create  additional indicators of the customer 
structure of each bank. Loan size (measured in log US Dollars) captures the average loan size 
to corporate clients, while Mortgage loans is the share of loans to households to finance 
housing. 
We also employ two indicators of the funding structure of a bank. Wholesale funding is 
taken from BankScope and captures non-customer liabilities as a share of total liabilities. 
Given that local currency interbank and debt markets are relatively underdeveloped in much 
of the transition region, we assume that the majority of non-customer liabilities of banks are 
denominated in foreign currency. Our second indicator of bank funding, FX deposits, is taken 
from BEPS and captures the share of customer deposits which are FX denominated. 
Finally,  we  use  BEPS  to  create  the  dummy  variable  Internal  ratings,  which  indicates 
whether a bank used an internal ratings based approach for the measurement of credit risk in 
2001 and/or 2004. We employ this variable as an indicator of how sophisticated each bank is 
in its operations. 
In our empirical analysis we alternatively employ country fixed effects and country-level 
explanatory variables to account for cross-country variation in macroeconomic conditions. 
Our country-level explanatory variables are taken from the EBRD Transition Report, the IMF 
International Financial Statistics, and the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. Interest rate differential is the difference between reference interest 
rates on the domestic currency and the euro. Peg is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
the local currency is pegged to either the euro or the US dollar. Exchange rate volatility 
captures the variation of month-on-month changes in the real exchange rate of the domestic 
currency to the euro. Inflation volatility captures the variation of month-on-month changes in 




3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table  3  provides  descriptive  statistics  for  all  our  variables.  Panel  A  reports  summary 
statistics  for  the  full  sample  as  well  as  means  by  bank-ownership,  while  Panel  B  shows 
summary statistics for our country-level variables. Table A1 in the Annex provides a matrix 
of pair-wise correlations. Table 3 shows that in 2004, 44 percent of all corporate lending and 
38 percent of all household lending by the banks in our sample was denominated in FX. 
Differences  in  the  share  of  FX  lending  are  substantial  across  banks,  with  some  banks 
displaying no FX loans while other banks have their entire loan portfolio in FX. Between 
2001 and 2004 there was an average increase of 3 and 10 percentage points, respectively, in 
the proportion of corporate and household loans denominated in FX. 
The  table  confirms  that  foreign  banks  lend  more  in  FX.  However,  there  is  a  marked 
difference in lending to firms and households. For corporate clients we see that in 2004 both 
greenfield and takeover foreign banks display a higher share of FX lending than domestic 
banks. Interestingly, FX lending by takeover banks converges to that of greenfield banks 
between 2001 and 2004, while FX lending by domestic banks to firms did not increase. For 
household loans we find that the share of FX lending increased strongly for all ownership 
types. In contrast to corporate lending, we also find that in 2004 the share of household loans 
in FX is similar for foreign takeover banks and domestic banks and that both bank types 
display a lower level of FX loans than foreign greenfield banks.
7 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
                                                 
7 Degryse et al. (2009), using a dataset on Polish banks, also find that in particular greenfield foreign banks 
provide more FX loans than domestic banks.  
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Banks’ total asset size and their average loan size to corporate borrowers are very similar 
across  bank  ownership  types.  Interestingly,  compared  to  domestic  banks,  foreign  banks 
allocate more than twice as much of their household loan portfolio to real estate loans. (cf. De 
Haas et al., 2010). In terms of funding structure, on average about 40 percent of all bank 
deposits  are  denominated  in  FX.  This  holds  for  all  bank  types,  indicating  that  the 
“euroisation” of deposits is mostly driven by the macroeconomic environment. Greenfield 
foreign banks rely much more on wholesale funding compared to foreign takeover banks or 
domestic  banks.  Finally,  about  80  per  cent  of  all  banks  used  an  internal  ratings  based 
approach to assess credit risk in 2004. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Are the differences in FX lending in Table 3 due to bank ownership per se, or are they 
related to variation in the client and funding structure of banks? The scatter plots in Figure 2 
provide some first insights into this issue. The figure shows no apparent relationship between 
average loan size and lending to corporates in FX, or between a bank’s focus on mortgage 
lending and its FX lending to households. It seems that banks are lending in FX to small, 
medium-sized and large firms alike, and provide households with both FX consumer and 
mortgage  debt.  The  figure  further  shows  no  apparent  bivariate  relationship  between  the 
proportion of wholesale funding and FX lending. By contrast, the last set of plots suggests 
that banks with a large share of FX denominated customer deposits lend more in FX. In line 
with  this,  Table  A1  in  the  Annex  shows  that  whereas  the  pair-wise  correlation  between 
wholesale funding and corporate and household FX lending is only 0.16 (p=0.04) and 0.13 
(p=0.09), respectively, the correlations between the proportion of FX deposits and both types 
of FX lending are 0.44 (p=0.00) and 0.43 (p=0.00). This is in line with the earlier mentioned  
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findings by Brown et al. (2010) on the importance of FX deposits for FX lending. The next 
section looks into these relationships in more detail. 
 
4. Multivariate results 
 
4.1. Cross-sectional variation in FX lending 
Table  4  provides  a  cross-sectional  analysis  of  banks’  FX  lending  to  corporate  clients 
(Panel A) and households (Panel B) in 2004. In line with the hypotheses developed in Section 
2, we analyze the impact of both bank-level characteristics – ownership, client, and funding 
structure  –  and  macroeconomic  determinants.  The  first  column  in  each  panel  displays  a 
parsimonious OLS specification in which the proportion of FX lending is explained by bank 
ownership. We then add bank-specific indicators of client and funding structure (columns 2-
3),  macroeconomic  variables  (columns  4-5),  and  interaction  terms  between  ownership 
dummies and the macro variables (column 6). All regressions include country fixed effects, 
except  those  in  columns  (4-5)  where  we  analyze  the  impact  of  (country-level) 
macroeconomic uncertainty.
8 
In  both  panels,  Column  (3)  replicates  column  (2)  while  instrumenting  for  Wholesale 
funding  with  Internal  rating.  We  instrument  Wholesale  funding  to  mitigate  endogeneity 
concerns,  since  the  proportion  of  FX  lending  may  impact  a  bank’s  wholesale  funding 
strategy. In contrast, we expect that our other funding measure, the proportion of deposits in 
FX,  is  exogenous  and  mainly  driven  by  the  external,  macroeconomic  environment.  The 
variable Internal ratings indicates whether the bank used an internal ratings based approach 
in 2004. Banks that use such an approach risk tend to be relatively sophisticated and may be 
                                                 
8 Since some banks provide no FX loans at all, we also ran models were we first estimate a probit regression and 
then a conditional OLS. This yields similar results to the unconditional OLS results reported in Table 4.  
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in a better position to attract wholesale funding. In line with this conjecture, Table A1 shows 
that Internal rating is quite strongly correlated with Wholesale funding but not with actual FX 
lending, making it a potentially strong instrument. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Table 4 displays three key findings: First, foreign ownership tends to be associated with 
more FX lending to firms but not to households. Column (1) in Panel A shows that when we 
ignore other determinants, greenfield foreign banks lend 17 percentage points more in FX 
than domestic banks. In sharp contrast, Panel B shows that bank ownership does not impact 
FX  lending  to  households.  Why  do  foreign  banks  lend  more  in  FX  to  firms  but  not  to 
households? One reason may be that households are a relatively homogenous borrower group 
whereas firms are more diverse. Foreign banks may serve a different set of corporate clients 
which have a higher demand for FX loans, for instance because they are larger and better 
diversified or because they have FX revenues that need to be hedged. Although Panel A 
shows that a bank’s client structure in terms of loan size is unrelated to the share of corporate 
loans in FX, foreign banks’ higher corporate FX lending may still be explained by omitted 
client variables, such as revenue structure, loan maturity, and ability to provide collateral. 
Our second main  finding is that the  currency  composition of deposits is a strong  and 
robust determinant of FX lending, both to firms and to retail clients. A 10 percent higher 
proportion of deposits that is denominated in FX is associated with a 5 to 6 percent higher 
proportion  of  FX  lending.  This  result  is  not  driven  by  between-country  variation  in  FX 
deposits – we include country fixed effects – but rather by variation within countries in the 
amount of FX deposits that a particular bank receives. The strong impact of FX denominated 
customer  deposits  confirms  recent  findings  by  Brown  et  al.  (2010)  as  well  as  Luca  and  
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Petrova (2008). In line with this research, as well as with the graphical evidence in Figure 2, 
we also find no impact of a bank’s wholesale funding on its proportion of FX lending.
9 
Our  third  finding  is  that  macroeconomic  stability  affects  FX  lending  by  banks,  and 
particularly foreign banks. In columns (5-6) of Panel A and B we examine explicitly whether 
corporate FX lending by foreign banks is more sensitive to the macroeconomic environment. 
To  do  this  we  interact  our  macroeconomic  indicators  with  the  dummy  variable  Foreign, 
which is 1 for greenfield and takeover foreign banks. This shows that only corporate FX 
lending by foreign banks is sensitive to real exchange rate volatility. Lower exchange rate 
volatility induces foreign banks but not domestic banks to lend more in FX to corporate 
clients.
10  A  one  percentage  point  increase  in  the  exchange  rate  volatility  reduces  the 
difference between foreign and domestic banks’ proportion of corporate FX lending by 4.4 
percentage  points.  In  contrast,  Panel  B  shows  that  the  negative  impact  of  exchange  rate 
volatility on household lending in FX was the same for foreign and domestic banks. 
Why  are  foreign  banks  (or  their  corporate  clients)  more  sensitive  to  macroeconomic 
uncertainty? Foreign banks may be more reluctant to lend in domestic currency because they 
mistrust domestic macroeconomic policy. Corporate clients may be more affected by such 
reluctance than households, as they are more likely to take unsecured loans than households. 
When we include indicators of macroeconomic (in)stability into our regression framework – 
Interest rate differential, Peg, Exchange rate volatility, and Inflation volatility – the statistical 
and  economic  significance  of  the  ownership  dummies  increases.  Whereas  foreign  banks 
                                                 
9 The marginally significant effect we find in column 2 disappears once we instrument Wholesale funding (this 
effect is indeed due to the instrumentation not due to the slight loss of observations).
 
10 We do not distinguish between greenfield and takeover foreign banks here because unreported regression 
results show no significant differences in the interaction effects between these two types of foreign banks.  
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provided on average 17 percentage points more of their corporate loan portfolio in FX, this 
difference between foreign and domestic banks would have been considerably higher in case 
real exchange rates had been less volatile. The results in Table 4 thus suggest that in a stable 
macroeconomic environment, foreign banks would lend more in FX to corporate clients but 
not to households. Again, this may be driven by the different corporate client structure of 
foreign banks as compared to domestic banks.  
Overall, our cross-sectional results suggest a key role for the macroeconomic environment 
as a driver of FX lending. First, we find that banks in countries with lower real exchange rate 
volatility lend more in FX. Second, within countries, we find that FX lending by both foreign 
and domestic banks is strongly related to the currency composition of their customer deposits 
but not to their levels of wholesale funding. As shown by De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2005) 
the macroeconomic environment is a key driver of deposit dollarisation. Third, we find that 
the currency composition of foreign banks’ corporate lending is more sensitive to changes in 
the macroeconomic environment than in the case of domestic banks.  
Finally,  our  cross-sectional  results  show  no  differences  between  foreign  and  domestic 
banks as to the determinants of their FX lending to households: both lend more in FX when 
real exchange rate volatility is lower and when inflows of FX deposits are higher. These 
results are remarkable as they run counter to the view that foreign banks, using cheap funding 
from abroad, have been ‘pushing’ FX loans into the hands of unsuspecting retail borrowers. 
 
4.2. Foreign ownership and changes in banks’ FX lending over time 
It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between bank-ownership, bank funding or 
monetary  conditions  and  FX  lending  from  our  cross-sectional  results  alone.  First,  the 
observed impact of customer funding may be driven by omitted bank-level characteristics, 
e.g. customers with income in FX, which affect both FX deposits and FX lending. Second,  
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the  observed  impact  of  macroeconomic  instability  may  be  driven  by  unobserved  country 
characteristics, e.g. institutional weaknesses which may be correlated with both weak macro 
policies and the absence of (exporting) firms which demand FX loans. Third, the observed 
relation between foreign bank ownership and FX lending to corporate clients may be due to 
reverse causality: Foreign greenfield banks may be more likely to enter countries where there 
are  more  clients  with  a  potential  demand  for  financial  services  in  foreign  currency,  i.e. 
countries with more export-oriented firms or a real estate market that is denominated in euro. 
Foreign institutions may also be more likely to take over domestic banks that already have a 
clientele that use financial services in foreign currency.
11 In this section, we try to mitigate 
concerns  of  omitted  variables  and  reverse  causality  by  looking  at  changes  in  banks’  FX 
lending  between  2001  and  2004,  controlling  for  time-invariant  bank-  and  country-
characteristics. 
In Table 5 we control for omitted bank-level and country-level variables by running first-
difference  regressions  using  a  sub-sample  of  banks  that  did  not  change  their  ownership 
structure during 2000-04. The dependent variable is the change (in percentage points) in the 
proportion of FX loans to corporate clients (Panel A) or retail clients (Panel B). Likewise all 
independent  variables  –with  the  obvious  exception  of  the  Foreign  held  dummy–  are 
expressed in changes as well. The structure of the specifications is similar to that in Table 4. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
                                                 
11 For instance, foreign banks like ABN Amro, Bank Austria, and Raiffeisen acknowledge the importance of 
serving foreign firms, in particular home-country clients, as part of their expansion strategy into Emerging 
Europe (De Haas and Naaborg, 2006).  
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Two results stand out. First, over 2001-04, foreign bank ownership does not impact the 
change in FX lending to firms or households. Second, in line with our cross-sectional results, 
we find a key  role for  the macroeconomic environment in influencing  the change in FX 
lending,  in  particular  for  foreign  banks.  Banks  in  countries  that  witnessed  a  decline  in 
exchange rate volatility and in interest rate differentials, increased their proportion of FX 
lending more. 
The result on exchange rate volatility is straightforward as a stable exchange rate implies 
less uncertainty about the real repayment burden of FX debt. However, the result on the 
change in the interest rate differential, in the case of corporate lending driven by foreign 
banks, is less intuitive. One may expect that if the interest rate differential between local 
currency and FX loans narrows, the relative demand for FX should decrease not increase. 
However, the finding is easier to understand in terms of supply considerations: banks, in 
particular foreign banks, have expanded their FX lending in particular in economies that were 
moving  towards  EU  accession  and  euro  adoption.  The  associated  macroeconomic  and 
institutional  stabilisation  may,  somewhat  paradoxically,  have  increased  the  incentives  for 
denominating debt in FX as the ‘certainty’ of a euro exit and the expectation of nominal 
exchange rate stability during the convergence trajectory made FX lending more attractive 
even when price differences came down at the same time. 
 
4.3. Foreign acquisition and changes in banks’ FX lending over time 
In Table 6 we control for reverse causality in the observed relationship between foreign 
bank ownership and FX lending (to firms) by analysing whether the currency composition of 
bank lending changes when a domestic bank is taken over by a foreign strategic investor. We 
now restrict our sample to all banks that were domestically owned before 2000. As in Table 
5, the dependent variable is the percentage point change in FX lending to firms (Panel A) or  
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households (Panel B). To measure the impact of foreign acquisition we compare banks that 
remained domestically owned over 2001-04 to those that were taken over by a foreign bank 
in either 2000, 2001, or 2002. The latter are captured by the dummy Foreign acquired.
12 
 
 [INSERT TABLE 6, PANEL A AND B HERE] 
 
The results in Table 6 do not indicate an effect of foreign acquisition on the proportion of 
bank lending in FX. While it may be possible that new subsidiaries get more access to FX 
denominated parent bank funding, or that after a takeover by a foreign bank a bank starts to 
lend more to similar (foreign) companies as the parent bank does (Peek and Rosengren, 1998) 
this does not seem to have a large or immediate effect on the proportion of FX lending to 
either corporate or retail clients. We do confirm, however, our previous result that countries 
that experienced macroeconomic stabilization over 2001-04, saw an increase in FX lending. 
Interestingly,  in  the  case  of  household  lending,  this  effect  is  partially  (interest  rate 
differential) or even completely (exchange rate volatility) absent for banks that were acquired 
by a foreign strategic investor during 2000-02. 
A  concern  with  our  analysis  in  Panels  A  and  B  of  Table  6  is  selection  bias.  Foreign 
institutions choose to takeover particular domestic banks. If our regressions omit indicators 
which  are  relevant  for  the  takeover  decision,  and  these  indicators  (such  as  the  share  of 
exporting firms) are positively correlated with initial FX lending, then we may underestimate 
the impact of foreign acquisition on the subsequent change in FX lending. 
                                                 
12 Our definition of Foreign acquired implies that after a takeover in 2000, 2001, or 2002 there are four, three, 
and two years, respectively, during which the integration into a multinational group may have influenced the FX 
lending of these banks. This should be enough time to pick up an effect of foreign ownership as the parent bank 




[INSERT TABLE 6, PANEL C HERE] 
 
In  Panel  C  we  therefore  report  a  propensity  scoring  exercise  in  which  we  attempt  to 
mitigate potential selection bias by comparing banks that were taken over by a foreign bank 
with similar banks that were not taken over (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
13 In a first step 
we  run  a  probit  regression  on  the  sub-sample  of  domestic  banks  in  2000  in  which  the 
dependent variable is Foreign acquired. This probit regression yields a propensity score (the 
conditional probability  of a bank being  acquired given pre-acquisition characteristics)  for 
each  individual  bank.  As  explanatory  variables  we  include  a  number  of  bank-level  and 
country-level  factors  that  may  impact  the  acquisition  of  a  domestic  bank  by  a  foreign 
investor: the size, profitability, and the proportion of FX lending of the bank in 2001, as well 
as the 1998-2000 average of: the percentage of foreign bank assets in total assets in the 
particular country, FDI as a percentage of GDP, the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, 
private credit volume as a percentage of GDP, and the EBRD Index of Banking Reform. We 
expect  that  acquiring  banks  are  mainly  interested  in  large  banks,  as  they  search  for  a 
minimum presence and scale in a country, profitable banks, and banks with an already high 
share of FX lending. We also expect that banks prefer to enter a country where the presence 
of other foreign banks is still limited (low competition), where FDI is high and the potential 
credit demand from foreign companies is therefore high as well (Grubel, 1977), which has a 
high fiscal deficit (so that the government may be more inclined to privatize state-owned 
banks), where lending levels are low, and where banking reforms are well advanced. The 
                                                 
13  See  Havrylchyk  and  Jurzyk  (2010)  for  a  similar  application  to  investigate  the  impact  of  foreign  bank 
ownership on the performance and market power of acquired banks.  
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probit  regression  results  (available  upon  request  from  the  authors)  show  that  the  main 
determinants of acquisition probability are bank size (+), the credit-to-GDP ratio (-), and the 
level of banking sector reform (+). All signs are in line with prior expectations. 
In a second step we match each ‘treated’ (acquired) bank to similar banks that were not 
acquired by a strategic investor. We either match an acquired bank to the closest propensity 
score (nearest neighbour match) or use Gaussian kernel matching.
14 The results in Panel C 
confirm  our  findings  in  Panels  A  and  B:  compared  to  banks  that  remained  in  domestic 
ownership, acquired banks did not see a significantly different change in FX lending over the 
2001-04 period. 
 
4.4. Convergence of FX lending within countries and within multinational bank networks 
Many countries covered by the BEPS experienced strong changes in the aggregate level of 
FX lending between 2001 and 2004. In Slovenia the aggregate share of FX lending increased 
from 17 to 42 percent, while in Bulgaria it increased from 35 to 48 percent. By contrast the 
aggregate share of FX loans in Serbia decreased from 78 to 29 percent, while in Kazakhstan 
it decreased from 71 to 52 percent. In this section we use our bank-level information on 
changes in FX lending between 2001 and 2004 to investigate how FX lending evolved in the 
transition  economies  during  this  period.  In  particular  we  examine  whether  FX  lending 
converged over time among banks within the same country and among subsidiaries of the 
same multinational banking network. Panel  A of Table 7 displays the  results for within-
country and Panel B for within-network convergence. 
                                                 
14 In the latter case the counterfactual outcome is calculated as a kernel-weighted average of the outcomes of all 
non-acquired banks where weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of 
acquired and non-acquired banks.  
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Panel A reports regressions on our sample of banks for which information on FX lending 
is available for 2001 and 2004. We relate the change in FX lending over the 2001-04 period 
to the dummy variable Low FX 2001 in country which is 1 if in 2001 a bank had a lower 
proportion of FX lending compared to the country average. In all models we control for 
cross-country variation in macroeconomic conditions with country fixed-effects. The results 
provide evidence for convergence of FX lending within countries. Banks with below-average 
levels of FX lending in 2001 were indeed the ones that increased the share of FX loans the 
fastest  between  2001  and  2004.  A  bank  that  had  below-average  FX  lending  in  2001 
subsequently increased its proportion of FX lending to corporates and households by 10 and 
12 per cent more, respectively, compared to banks in the same country that already provided 
high  proportions  of  FX  debt  in  2001.  In  unreported  regressions  we  also  find  that  this 
convergence effect is asymmetric: banks with below-average FX lending increase their FX 
lending faster but banks with above-average FX lending do not decrease their FX lending 
towards the country mean. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
In Panel B of Table 7 we examine whether there is also convergence of FX lending among 
the  members  of  multinational  bank  networks.  If  there  would  be,  even  when  we  include 
country fixed effects, this would be in line with parent banks that steer the proportion of FX 
lending by their subsidiaries to a group-wide target level, independent of the funding of the 
subsidiary itself or the host-country macroeconomic environment. 
For  this  exercise  we  analyze  a  subsample  of  banks  which  belong  to  a  multinational 
banking group – such as UniCredit Group, Raiffeisen International, or Société Générale – and 
for which we have at least three subsidiaries from the group in our sample. In all models we  
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relate bank-level changes in FX lending between 2001 and 2004 to a dummy variable Low 
FX 2001 within network which is 1 for those subsidiaries with a proportion of FX lending 
below  the  2001  average  for  the  group  they  belong  to.  As  in  Panel  A  we  find  positive 
coefficients  for  the  variable  Low  FX  2001,  however  the  estimates  are  neither  precisely 
estimated  nor  robust.  We  therefore  cannot  conclude  that  during  our  observation  period 
multinational banking groups used their internal capital markets to equalize the proportion of 
FX lending throughout their network. Finally, note that in line with Tables 4 and 5B, the 
increase in FX deposits is a strong determinant of increased FX lending to households. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
We  use  a  unique  dataset  –  containing  detailed  information  on  the  loan  and  deposit 
structure of nearly 200 banks in 20 transition economies – to examine how FX lending is 
related to bank ownership, bank funding, and the macroeconomic environment. We focus on 
the role that foreign-owned banks have played in contributing to the widespread use of FX 
lending. 
Our  main  result  is  that  there  is  not  much  empirical  evidence  that  foreign  banks  have 
contributed more to euroisation than domestic banks. Although foreign banks lend more to 
corporate clients in FX, we find no differences between domestic and foreign banks in their 
currency denomination of household lending – one of the main drivers of the rapid increase 
in FX lending. Over time, foreign banks did not expand their FX lending faster than domestic 
banks and the proportion of FX lending did not increase after a domestic bank was taken over 
by a foreign investor. We also find no robust evidence that FX lending is related to wholesale 
funding of banks, or that FX lending converged within multinational banking groups during 
our observation period.  
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These findings tell us that foreign banks did not indiscriminately ‘push’ FX loans through 
their subsidiary network in the transition region, but followed a more subtle approach where 
FX  lending  is  targeted  to  (corporate)  clients  that  can  carry  the  associated  risks  and  to 
countries in which FX lending is attractive from a macroeconomic perspective. Indeed, we 
find that FX lending by foreign banks is more sensitive to macroeconomic uncertainty than 
lending by domestic banks. In effect, macroeconomic uncertainty – in particular exchange 
rate volatility – turns out to be a strong determinant of FX lending by all banks. Indirectly the 
macroeconomic  environment  may  matter  as  well,  as  FX  denominated  customer  deposits 
strongly influence FX lending at the bank level. We also find that FX lending converges over 
time among banks within the same country. 
Our results provide important insights to policy makers into the drivers of FX lending in 
Eastern Europe. Our results show that FX customer deposits rather than wholesale funding 
have  been  a  key  driver  of  FX  lending  in  the  region.  This  suggests  that  credible 
macroeconomic policies which encourage customers to save in local currency may in many 
countries  be  more  important  than  regulatory  proposals  to  limit  the  wholesale  funding  of 
(foreign)  banks.  Indeed,  countries  like  the  Czech  Republic  and  Poland  demonstrate  how 
adherence  to  credible  macroeconomic  policies  can  result  in  relatively  low  levels  of  FX 
lending even when a majority of the banking system is foreign owned. Similarly, various 
Latin  American  countries  have  successfully  de-dollarised  by  moving  to  macroeconomic 
regimes that were more conducive to local currency funding, including flexible exchange rate 
regimes and inflation targeting (see Zettelmeyer et al., 2010). 
Indeed,  in  countries  with  weak  monetary  and  fiscal  institutions  a  strong  regulatory 
response  to  reduce  FX  lending  may  even  be  counterproductive  as  lending  in  domestic 
currency is not a realistic alternative in the short term. In those cases, reducing FX lending 
through regulation may just lead to less bank lending. The current policies in Ukraine and  
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Belarus,  where  new  FX  denominated  mortgage  loans  (Ukraine)  or  all  FX  retail  loans 
(Belarus) have been banned, may come at the cost of an even sharper decline in bank lending. 
This is not to say that regulation can or should not play a role in reducing FX lending. 
Regulation may well be advisable if banks and their customers create (unhedged) FX debt 
whilst  disregarding  that  growing  currency  mismatches  may  increase  the  probability  of  a 
systemic crisis. Such behaviour may become apparent when banks count on an explicit or 
implicit government commitment to maintain nominal exchange rate stability (see Ranciere 
et al., 2010) such as in the run up to euro membership. Indeed, our empirical results indicate 
that  FX  lending  increased  the  most  in  those  countries  where  interest  rate  differentials 
declined  rapidly.  In  such  cases,  regulators  may  for  instance  require  banks  to  hold 
unremunerated reserve requirements on their FX funding or may introduce higher capital 
and/or  provisioning  requirements  for  FX  loans.  Poland  has  been  successful  in  weighing 
against  the  tide  of  FX  lending  by  introducing  the  so-called  Recommendation  S  in  2006, 
which required banks to apply stricter credit underwriting standards and to disclose FX risks 
when providing FX mortgages. Measures like these may partially restore a level playing field 
between  FX  and  local  currency  loans  and  force  banks  and  their  borrowers  to  take  the 
externalities of their lending decisions into account. 
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FX loans households 2001 (%)Figure 2.  FX lending, loan type and bank funding in 2004
This figure plots for 2004 FX loans corporates against Loan size, Wholesale funding and FX deposits. It further plots FX loans households against 
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South Eastern Europe (SEE) 72 22 22 28 13






Serbia 18 4 3 11 0
Commonwealth of 




Russia 27 3 0 24 0
Ukraine 83050
Total 193 44 51 98 (28)
The table reports the number of banks in our sample by country and ownership type. Greenfield banks are
foreign banks established from scratch, whereas takeover banks are foreign banks that are the result of a
takeover of a domestic bank by a foreign strategic investor. Acquired banks are takeover banks that were
acquired in  2000, 2001, or 2002. Source: BEPS.
Table 1.  Bank ownership by countryVariable name Periodicity Description Source
FX loans corporates 2001, 2004 Share of FX loans in all loans to corporations (%) BEPS
FX loans households 2001, 2004 Share of FX loans in all loans to households (%) BEPS
Foreign greenfield 2004 1= bank is a newly established 'greenfield' foreign bank, 0= otherwise BEPS, websites
Foreign takeover 2004 1= bank is a foreign bank resulting from a take‐over, 0= otherwise BEPS, websites
Domestic 2004 1= bank is domestically owned, 0=otherwise BEPS, websites
Foreign held 2000‐2004 1= if bank was foreign owned from 2000‐2004, 0= bank was domestically owned from 2000‐2004. BEPS, websites
Foreign acquired 2000‐2004 1= domestic bank was acquired by a foreign investor in 2000, 2001 or 2002, 0= otherwise BEPS, websites
Assets 2001, 2004 Total assets (in log USD) BankScope
Loan size 2001, 2004 Average loan size to corporations (Log USD) BEPS
Mortgage loans 2001, 2004 Share of mortgage loans in all loans to households (%) BEPS
Wholesale funding 2001, 2004 Non‐customer liabilities as a share of total bank liabilities (in %) BankScope
FX deposits 2001, 2004 Share of FX denominated customer deposits in all customer deposits (%) BEPS
Internal ratings 2001, 2004 Internal ratings are used for credit risk assessment (yes=1, no=0) BEPS
Interest rate differential 2001‐2004 Domestic Tbill or money market rate minus Eurepo rate (in % p.a.) IMF‐IFS
Peg 2001‐2004 Domestic currency is pegged to the USD or Euro. IMF‐AREAER
Exchange rate volatility 2001‐2004 Variance of monthly changes in the real exchange rate versus the Euro IMF‐IFS
Inflation volatility 2001‐2004 Variance of monthly changes in the consumer price index IMF‐IFS
Country‐level data  (# countries = 20)
Table 2. Variable descriptions
Bank‐level data (# banks = 193)
This table presents definitions and sources of all variables used in our empirical analysis. BEPS is the EBRD Bank Environmentand Performance Survey conducted in 2005. BankScope
is Bureau van Dijk's BankScope database of bank balance sheet and income statement data. EBRD-TR is the EBRD Transition Report 2004. IMF-IFS are the International Financial
Statistics provided by the International Monetary Fund. IMF-AREAR is the annual report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions by the International Monetary Fund.Variable name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Greenfield Takeover Domestic
FX loans corporates 179 44.0 28.9 0 100 51.3 50.4 37.6
FX loans households 174 38.0 36.1 0 100 45.7 36.1 35.5
Assets 187 20.0 1.6 16.1 24.1 20.1 20.7 19.7
Loan size 166 13.4 3.7 6.6 29.3 14.2 13.9 12.7
Mortgage loans 163 32.5 28.6 0 100 44.6 45.6 19.4
Wholesale funding 187 31.9 22.2 1 99 44.0 28.6 27.8
FX deposits 176 41.7 23.6 0 99 43.0 37.2 43.4
Internal ratings 178 0.80 0.40 0 1 0.80 0.84 0.78
FX loans corporates 166 2.5 20.4 ‐54 98 0.7 10.0 ‐0.1
FX loans households 158 9.8 32.4 ‐95 100 11.5 9.6 9.2
Assets 155 1.0 0.5 ‐0.7 2.9 1.1 1.0 1.0
Loan size 138 0.6 0.9 ‐2.0 5.8 0.4 0.7 0.7
Mortgage loans 137 7.2 23.7 ‐99 75 12.9 4.4 6.0
Wholesale funding 155 3.0 15.3 ‐42 50 4.5 5.4 0.9
FX deposits 167 ‐4.1 16.0 ‐52 62 ‐3.4 ‐2.1 ‐5.5
Variable name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Interest  differential 20 6.9 9.2 0.4 37.4
Peg 20 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Exchange rate volatility 20 6.5 4.2 0.7 16.5
Inflation volatility 20 0.7 0.6 0.1 2.2
Interest  differential 20 ‐4.5 9.6 ‐38.3 3.8
Peg 19 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
Exchange rate volatility 18 0.9 3.9 ‐5.6 10.5
Inflation volatility 19 ‐0.5 1.6 ‐71
Country‐level variables:  2004‐2001 differences
This table provides summarystatistics for the 2004 values and 2004-2001 differences of our bank-level and country-level
variables. Table 2 provides variable definitions and sources.
Panel A.  Bank-level variables
Country‐level variables:  2001‐2004 averages
 Full sample summary statistics




This panel provides summary statistics for the full sample as well as conditional means for sub-samples by bank 
ownership.
Panel B.  Country-level variablesDependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign greenfield 16.96** 4.451 5.696 14.350 35.46** 53.17*
[7.805] [9.518] [12.84] [9.526] [17.74] [27.95]
Foreign takeover 7.675 5.404 4.855 9.776* 27.10* 46.45**
[6.907] [8.943] [6.394] [5.760] [14.29] [19.45]
Assets 1.607 1.725 2.867** 4.437*** 2.887
[2.423] [1.617] [1.409] [1.638] [1.792]
Loan size ‐0.341 ‐0.418 0.067 ‐0.379 ‐1.059
[0.752] [0.705] [0.766] [0.848] [0.843]
Wholesale funding 0.366* 0.272 ‐0.029 ‐0.278 ‐0.204
[0.178] [0.508] [0.444] [0.533] [0.713]
FX deposits 0.409*** 0.427*** 0.486*** 0.480*** 0.515***


















Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes yes no no yes
R
2 0.45 0.56 0.55 0.38 0.35 0.51
# Banks 152 152 146 146 146 146
# countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
Table 4.  FX lending in 2004
Panel A. Lending to corporations
In this panel the dependent variable is FX loans corporates in 2004. Models (1-2, 4-6) report OLS estimates. Model (3) reports
IV estimates in which Wholesale funding in 2004 is instrumented with the variable Internal ratings. Models (1-3, 6) include
country fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. In models (1-2, 4-6) standard errors are adjusted for clustering by
country. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.  Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
FX loans corporatesDependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign greenfield 16.270 0.853 13.100 12.260 ‐13.570 ‐24.800
[10.10] [11.88] [27.34] [16.92] [33.22] [61.43]
Foreign takeover 12.550 7.507 12.300 11.100 ‐11.280 ‐20.880
[9.057] [8.179] [11.83] [8.985] [23.88] [41.85]
Assets 1.521 0.723 1.673 1.396 0.877
[1.795] [1.922] [1.767] [1.789] [1.914]
Mortgage loans 0.216 0.195 0.226* 0.259* 0.245
[0.159] [0.125] [0.127] [0.135] [0.155]
Wholesale funding 0.172 ‐0.272 ‐0.140 0.063 0.051
[0.118] [0.841] [0.644] [0.756] [1.132]
FX deposits 0.603*** 0.529*** 0.620*** 0.591*** 0.454***


















Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes yes no no yes
R
2 0.50 0.60 0.55 0.38 0.43 0.61
# Banks 147 147 141 141 141 141
# countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
Table 4.  FX lending in 2004
Panel B. Lending to households
In this panel the dependent variable is FX loans households in 2004. Models (1-2, 4-6) report OLS estimates. Model (3) reports
IV estimates in which Wholesale funding in 2004 is instrumented with the variable Internal ratings. Models (1-3, 6) include
country fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. In models (1-2, 4-6) standard errors are adjusted for clustering by
country. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Tabel 2 provides the definitions and sources of all
variables.
FX loans householdsDependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign held 5.065 10.350 6.816 0.324 ‐0.262
























Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes no no yes
R
2 0.23 0.43 0.17 0.26 0.38
# Banks 135 90 118 118 118
# countries 20 20 18 18 18
Table 5. Foreign ownership and changes in FX lending
In this panel we examine the sample of banks that were either domestically owned or foreign owned during the entire
period 2000-2004 and which report data on FX lending for 2001 and 2004. The dependent variables are the percentage
point changes in FX lending (2004 minus 2001). Panel A reports estimates for FX loans corporates, Panel B reports
estimates for FX loans households. All models in both panels report OLS estimates. Models (1-2, 5) include country
fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
Panel A. Lending to corporations
FX loans corporates (2004 minus 2001)Dependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign held 2.596 ‐5.797 3.398 2.063 2.021
























Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes no no yes
R
2 0.39 0.61 0.31 0.32 0.42
# Banks 126 81 111 111 111
# countries 18 18 16 16 16
Panel B. Lending to households
FX loans households (2004 minus 2001)Dependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign acquired ‐4.859 ‐8.495 ‐2.164 ‐3.942 ‐4.231


























Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes no no yes
R
2 0.21 0.39 0.15 0.16 0.26
# Banks 117 73 103 103 103
# countries 18 18 16 16 16
FX loans corporates (2004 minus 2001)
In this panel we compare the change in FX lending (2004 minus 2001) by domestic banks which were acquired in
2000, 2001 or 2002 to the change in FX lending by domestic banks that were not acquired. The dependent variables
are percentage point changes in FX lending (2004 minus 2001). Panel A reports estimates for FX loans corporates, 
Panel B reports estimates for FX loans households. All models in both panels report OLS estimates. Models (1-2, 5)
and include country fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country
level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. The definitions of all variables are provided in
Table 2.
Panel A. Lending to corporations
Table 6. Foreign acquisition and changes in FX lendingDependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign acquired 2.229 ‐1.657 1.110 2.090 3.499


























Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes no no yes
R
2 0.42 0.66 0.33 0.35 0.45
# Banks 115 71 102 102 102
# countries 18 18 16 16 16
Panel B. Lending to households
FX loans households (2004 minus 2001)Acquired Not Acquired Difference S.E. T‐stat
FX loans  corporates Unmatched 5.35 1.96 3.39 6.69 0.51
Nearest neighbour matching 5.35 0.14 5.21 6.42 0.81
Kernel matching 7.53 0.59 6.94 8.74 0.79
FX loans  households Unmatched 0.47 7.69 ‐7.22 8.19 ‐0.88
Nearest neighbour matching 0.47 8.58 ‐8.11 8.27 ‐0.98
Kernel matching 0.59 7.72 ‐7.13 12.25 ‐0.58
Panel C. Controlling for endogenous acquisition - Propensity score matching
In this panel we compare the change in FX lending (2004 minus 2001) by domestic banks which were acquired in 2000, 2001 or 2002 to the
change in FX lending by domestic banks that were not acquired. The propensity to be acquired is estimated as a function of the banks Asset 
volume (Log) and Return on assets (%) in 2000, its FX lending to corporates and households in 2001 as well as the following country level
indicators (averaged for 1998-2000): Assets of foreign banks (% of total bank assets), Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) , Fiscal balance (%
of GDP), Private credit volume (% of GDP) and the EBRD Index of Bank Reform. All of these variables are taken from the EBRD Transition
Report 2000. The table reports treatment effects based on unmatched comparisons as well as nearest neigbour matching and kernel matching. Dependent variable (2004 minus 2001)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low FX 2001 within country 12.78*** 9.865** 21.01*** 12.23*
[3.097] [4.331] [6.917] [6.325]
Low FX 2001  in network 24.05** 14.250 18.440 21.580
[11.15] [17.19] [17.54] [14.34]
Bank‐level changes 2004 ‐01:
Assets 3.960 2.172 53.430 12.160





Wholesale funding 0.132 ‐0.004 0.217 1.049
[0.120] [0.113] [0.561] [0.889]
FX deposits ‐0.115 0.381* ‐0.570 0.741***
[0.162] [0.182] [0.796] [0.0845]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R
2 0.27 0.41 0.46 0.61 0.49 0.74 0.75 0.83
# Banks 166 106 158 102 46 27 44 31
# countries 20 20 20 20 18 14 18 14
Table 7.  Convergence of FX lending
FX loans households FX loans corporates FX loans corporates FX loans households
In Panel A we analyze data for banks which report data for 2001 and 2004. Low FX 2001 in country is a dummy variable which is 1 if the bank had a lower fraction of FX
loans to corporates (households) in 2001 than the country mean. In Panel B we analyze data for banks that are subsidiaries of a multinational bank. Low FX 2001 in
network is a dummy variable which is 1 if the bank had a lower fraction of FX loans to corporates (households) in 2001 compared to the mean of all subsidiaries of the
multinational bank it belongs to. All models report OLS estimates. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering by country. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table 2 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
Panel B. Within network convergence Panel A. Within country convergence[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
[1] FX loans corporates 1.00
[2] FX loans households 0.60 1.00
[3] Assets 0.03 0.01 1.00
[4] Loan size 0.17 0.16 0.21 1.00
[5] Mortgage loans 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.14 1.00
[6] Wholesale funding 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.02 ‐0.04 1.00
[7] FX deposits 0.44 0.43 ‐0.14 0.02 0.03 ‐0.11 1.00
[8] Internal ratings ‐0.08 ‐0.02 0.05 0.02 ‐0.10 0.24 ‐0.10 1.00
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] FX loans corporates 1.00
[2] FX loans households 0.27 1.00
[3] Assets ‐0.02 0.11 1.00
[4] Loan size 0.12 0.14 0.22 1.00
[5] Mortgage loans ‐0.15 0.01 ‐0.14 ‐0.13 1.00
[6] Wholesale funding 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.09 ‐0.02 1.00
[7] FX deposits 0.09 0.26 ‐0.03 0.10 0.15 ‐0.04 1.00
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
[1] FX loans corporates 1.00
[2] FX loans households 0.82 1.00
[3] Interest  rate differential 0.37 0.41 1.00
[4] Peg 0.33 0.06 0.16 1.00
[5] Exchange rate volatility ‐0.37 ‐0.58 ‐0.37 ‐0.07 1.00
[6] Inflation volatility 0.34 0.31 0.39 ‐0.28 ‐0.10 1.00
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
[1] FX loans corporates 1.00
[2] FX loans households 0.23 1.00
[3] Interest rate differential ‐0.15 ‐0.71 1.00
[4] Peg ‐0.06 0.28 ‐0.15 1.00
[5] Exchange rate volatility ‐0.60 0.03 ‐0.20 0.03 1.00
[6] Inflation volatility 0.02 ‐0.44 0.09 ‐0.06 ‐0.04 1.00
Panel A. Bank-level variables: 2004
This table provides pairwise correlations for the 2004 values and 2004-01 differences of our bank-level and
country-level variables. Table 2 provides variable definitions and sources.
Table A1.  Pairwise correlations
Pabel B. Bank-level variables: 2004-2001 differences
Panel C. Country-level variables: 2001-04 averages
Panel D. Country-level variables: 2004-01 differences